U.S.+vs.+Playboy+(R7)

media type="custom" key="3546382"MICHAEL ROHALL,RYAN SOBACK, JORDAN CALER


 * Playboy vs. USA**

 **__10 FACTS__**  1. Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires cable television operators providing channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" either to "fully scramble or otherwise fully block. 2. The purpose of section 505 was to protect non-subscribers, and their children, from "signal bleed," or when audio and visual portions of the scrambled programs might be heard or seen. 3. In February 1996, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. filed suit challenging section 505's constitutionality. 4. A three-judge District Court panel found that section 505's content-based restriction on speech violated the First Amendment because Government might further its interests in less restrictive ways. 5. The court also found that the Act provided for a less restrictive alternative than section 505, in that section 504 stated that cable operators had an obligation to block channels at a customer's request. 6. Many adults would find the material at issue highly offensive, and considering that the material comes unwanted into homes where children might see or hear it against parental wishes or consent, there are legitimate reasons for regulating it. 7. It also singles out particular programmers for regulation. 8. The [|First Amendment] requires a more careful assessment and characterization of an evil in order to justify a regulation as sweeping as this. 9. The District Court did not err in holding the statute violative of the [|First Amendment]. 10. The purpose of US vs. Playboy is to shield children from hearing or seeing images resulting from signal bleed. __**Major Issues**__ The case discussed the first amendment. The problem was that Playboy was showing explicit material on television when children were able to watch because it was on too early.


 * __First Amendment Establishment Clause__

Two clauses of the First Amendment concern the relationship of government to religion: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Although the clauses were intended by the framers to serve common values, there is some tension between the two. For example, some people might suggest that providing a military chaplain for troops stationed overseas violates the Establishment Clause, while others might suggest that //failing to provide// a chaplain violates the Free Exercise Clause rights of the same troops. We will, however, postpone discussion of how the two clauses ought to be reconciled, and begin with an examination of the meaning of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause was intended to prohibit the federal government from declaring and financially supporting a national religion, just as many others countries.** __**IMPACT**__ Shows that are not deemed appropriate for young kids are going to be on at a later time frame

__**DISSENTING ARGUMENT**__ Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Scalia join, dissenting. (1) There is no concluding evidence to ban these programs from daytime television (2) Since there was not enough evidence for a ban they can not take nudity off the air. __**Reasoning**__ **1 Appellee states that our claim that "the government's interest is stronger here than in the broadcasting context because Pacifica involved the one-time broadcast of inappropriate language compared to channels that carry virtually 100% sexually explicit adult programming is not correct, nor is it supported by the record below." Mot. to Aff. 12 (quoting J.S. 17) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court repeatedly stated that "[t]he programming on the Playboy network is virtually 100% sexually explicit adult programming." J.S. App. 5a-6a; see also id. at 42a, 47a. Indeed, the court distinguished appellee's broadcasting from that of other channels, which broadcast material "which contained some sexually explicit scenes but were not continuously sexually explicit." Id. at 6a. A child may therefore easily find sexually explicit material by tuning in to signal bleed from appellee's channels.

2 Appellee errs in stating that "[t]here is no dispute that Section 505 prevents the transmission of Appellee's programming during 'the hours when most viewers want to see such programming.'" Mot. to Aff. 15 (quoting J.S. 18 n.6); see also id. at 3, 27. The district court found that "30-50% of all adult programming is viewed by households prior to 10 p.m." J.S. App. 33a. It follows that 50-70% of such programming is viewed after 10 p.m. and would not therefore be affected by Section 505. The safe harbor provision of Section 505 permits the transmission of appellee's programming when most viewers want to see it, and it imposes only a minor restriction on the minority who want to view it at a different time. The cited portion of the jurisdictional statement makes that point. See J.S. 18 n.6 ("We do not dispute that time-channeling of indecent sexually explicit television programming to the hours when most viewers want to see such programming is a restriction on such programming."). Indeed, the fact that the safe-harbor hours are precisely the hours when adults usually want to view sexually explicit programming, coupled with the easy availability of VCR machines to tape such programming and play it at a time convenient to the viewer, emphasizes the relatively modest scope of the restriction imposed by Section 505.**

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